19 out of every hundred medical claims filed in America gets denied. We'll end this video on that number, but here's where it began. In 1666, a fire burned down almost all of London.
在美国提交的每百份医疗索赔中，有19份会被拒绝。我们将以这个数字结束本期视频，但故事要从这里说起。1666年，一场大火几乎烧毁了整个伦敦。
13,000 houses gone in 4 days. The king asked the whole country to donate money to rebuild it. People gave less than 200ths of 1% of what the city had lost. Basically nothing. So, a doctor named Nicholas Barbin looked at a burnedout city full of people with no way to protect their next house.
4天内13000栋房屋被毁。国王要求全国捐款重建。人们捐赠的金额不到这座城市损失的1%的200分之一。基本上什么都没有。于是，一位名叫尼古拉斯·巴宾的医生看着一座被烧毁的城市满是人们无法保护他们的下一栋房子。
And he had an idea that made him rich. Sell people a promise. If your house burns down, we pay to rebuild it. All you have to do is pay us a little bit every year before it happens.
他有一个想法，让他发了财。向人们兜售一个承诺。如果你的房子被烧毁，我们出钱重建。你只需每年付给我们一点钱在事情发生之前。
That promise is now one of the biggest businesses on Earth and an industry worth $40 trillion. It made a stock picker from Nebraska one of the five richest men alive. It decides whether your surgery gets paid for, whether your agent tries to sell you the cheap policy or the expensive one.
这个承诺如今已成为地球上最大的生意之一一个价值40万亿美元的产业。它让一个来自内布拉斯加州的选股人成为在世最富有的五个人之一。它决定你的手术能否报销，决定你的agent是否会试图向你推销便宜的保单还是昂贵的保单。
And almost nobody knows how the machine works. So, let's fix that. Some people get rich using insurance while most people get poorer with every premium paid. You hand money over every year and most years get nothing back for it.
几乎没有人知道这台机器是如何运作的。所以，让我们来解决这个问题。有些人通过保险变得富有而大多数人却随着每一笔保费的支付而变得更穷。你每年都交钱而大多数年份什么也拿不回来。
But a billionaire holding the other end of that same contract doesn't take your premium and lock it into a vault. No, they invest it for years before they ever have to pay a dime of it back.
但拿着同样合同另一端的亿万富翁并不会拿走你的保费把它锁进金库里。不，他们会把它投资多年，然后才需要赔付一分钱作为回报。
What makes you poorer every month makes them some of the richest people in the world. By the end of this video, you'll know how everything works. Why your premium keeps climbing even when you never file a claim.
是什么让你每个月越来越穷却让他们成为最富有的人群之一。看完这个视频，你就会明白这一切是如何运作的。为什么你的保费不断上涨，即使你从未提出过理赔。
How robots deny claims without anyone looking over your file. Why the safe life insurance policy is usually the worst deal for you and one of the best for whoever sold it to you and exactly how the ultra rich flip this same industry around and use it to compound money for decades tax advantaged completely legally.
机器人如何拒绝理赔而无人审查你的档案。为什么安全型人寿保险通常是对你最糟糕的交易，却是卖给</title></head>你保险的人最划算的交易之一以及超级富豪究竟如何扭转同一行业并利用它数十年来复利增值，完全合法地享受税收优惠。
This is episode one of a new series called the millionaire map where we are opening up real industries and showing you exactly how the money moves. Welcome to alux.com. The place where future billionaires come to get inspired.
这是新系列的第一集名为《百万富翁地图》我们将在这里揭开真实行业的面纱并向你精确展示资金的流动方式。欢迎来到alux.com。未来亿万富翁获取灵感的地方。
All right. So, picture 100 people standing in a room. Every one of them is afraid of the same thing. Their house burning down. So, in a normal year, maybe one out of those 100 houses actually catches on fire.
好吧。想象一下，100个人站在一个房间里。他们每个人都害怕同样的东西。他们的房子被烧毁。所以，在正常年份，那100栋房子里也许只有一栋会真的着火。
Nobody knows in advance which one. So, all 100 people put $5,000 each into a shared pot. That's $500,000 sitting in the middle of the room in the range of what it actually costs to rebuild a house.
没人能提前知道是哪一栋。于是，100个人每人往一个共享资金池里放了5000美元。也就是50万美元摆在房间中央，差不多相当于重建一栋房子的实际费用。
Now, if one house burns down this year, the pot pays out enough to rebuild it. Say $400,000. The unlucky homeowner gets made whole. The other 99 people just lost $5,000 each for nothing.
现在，如果今年有一栋房子被烧毁，这个资金池赔付的钱就足够重建它。说40万美元。倒霉的房主得到了全额赔偿。其余99人白白损失了每人5000美元。
Except now they know if it had been their house, they would have been covered, too. Whoever runs that room keeps whatever is left over after paying the claim. In this case, $100,000 as pure profit just for organizing the pot and doing the math on how likely that fire actually was.
只不过现在他们知道，如果那是他们的房子，他们也会得到赔付，也一样。经营那个资金池的人拿走赔付之后剩下的所有钱。在这个案例中，10万美元纯利润，仅仅是为了组织这个资金池并计算那场火灾实际发生的可能性。
That's the entire trick behind every insurance company that has ever existed. Spread a loss big enough to ruin one person across a group large enough that it barely dents anybody and keep whatever's left over.
这就是所有保险公司背后的全部把戏，从古至今无一例外。把足以毁掉一个人的巨大损失分散到一个足够大的群体中，大到几乎不会对任何人造成实质影响，然后留下所有剩下的钱。
It's just math and they have it down to a science. So, they're able to do it at scale. The first person to actually run the math figured it out by accident, standing in a city that had just burned to the ground with no other options left.
这不过是数学而已，而他们已经将其研究得炉火纯青。所以，他们能够大规模地做到这一点。第一个真正进行运算的人是偶然发现的，他站在一座刚刚被烧毁的城市里，别无选择。
Chapter 1. The greatest bet in London. Now, picture London in the 1680s. The city is still rebuilding from the fire. Nicholas Barbin opens up something the world has never seen before called the fire office.
第一章。伦敦最大的赌局。现在，想象一下17世纪80年代的伦敦。这座城市仍在从大火中重建。尼古拉斯·巴宾开启了一项世人从未见过的事物在此之前致电消防局。
Now, his first customer buys a policy on a house in a neighborhood called Barbin. Policy number 1403. The cost £130. So, within 10 years, one out of every 10 houses in London had one of these policies.
现在，他的第一位客户购买了一份保单为一栋位于名为巴宾的街区的房子保单号1403。花费了130英镑。所以，在10年内，伦敦每10栋房子中就有一栋拥有这类保单。
And the companies selling them came up with something clever to prove it. A metal plate bolted right above the front door called a fireark. It showed which company insured that house.
而销售这些保单的公司想出了一个聪明的办法来证明这一点。一块用螺栓固定在前门正上方的金属板叫做火灾保险标志。上面显示哪家公司为那栋房子承保。
Now, for the wild part. Back then, there was no city fire department. The insurance companies ran their own private fire brigades. When a house caught on fire, the brigade would show up, look for the plate, and if it was the wrong company's plate or no plate at all, some crews would just let it burn and go help a paying customer instead.
现在，说到了不起的部分。那时候，没有城市消防局。保险公司经营着自己的私人消防队。当一栋房子着火时，消防队会赶到，寻找那块牌子，如果那是别家公司的牌子，或者根本没有牌子，有些消防队就会任由它烧毁，转而去帮助付费客户。
Your neighbor's house might get saved, but yours might not. All based on a metal plate. And that's the version of insurance where you can actually see the deal. Pay us, get the plate, get protected, don't pay, and take your chances.
你邻居的房子可能会获救，但你的可能不会。全都基于一块金属板。而这就是保险的那种版本你能真正看到交易的那种。付钱给我们，拿到车牌，获得保护，不付钱，那就自求多福吧。
Brutal, yes, but honest. But this wasn't just a London story for long. Barely 70 years later, a young printer in Philadelphia named Benjamin Franklin looked at the exact same problem, a city that kept burning down and copied the idea.
残酷，没错，但很诚实。但这并不只是伦敦的故事，没多久就蔓延开了。仅仅70年后，费城一位名叫本杰明·富兰克林的年轻印刷商审视了完全相同的问题，一座不断被烧毁的城市，并复制了这一理念。
In 1752, Franklin helped to found the Philadelphia Contribution Ship, the first successful fire insurance company in America. It used its own version of the Firemark, too. A metal plaque shaped like two clasped hands bolted above the front door of every house it covered.
1752年，富兰克林协助创立了费城贡献船保险公司，美国第一家成功的火灾保险公司。它也使用了自己版本的火灾保险标志。一块形似两只紧握之手的金属牌被螺栓固定在前它所承保的每一栋房屋的门上。
That company is still insuring homes today, more than 270 years later, making it one of the oldest continuously operating businesses in the entire country. So, the idea that started as a London hustle became one of the founding fathers side projects and it never left American life again.
那家公司至今仍在为房屋承保，270多年后，使其成为全美历史最悠久且持续经营的企业之一。于是，这个最初只是伦敦街头骗局的点子成了开国元勋们的副业之一，从此再未离开美国人的生活。
Now, a quick pause before we keep going. If you're new here, this is exactly the kind of thing we do every week. Take an entire industry apart and show you precisely how the money moves.
现在，在我们继续之前，稍作停顿。如果你是第一次来这里，这正是我们每周都会做的事情。把一个完整的行业拆解开来，精确地向你展示资金是如何流动的。
So, hit subscribe now so you don't miss where this one goes because it's about to get a lot stranger. So word got out on both sides of the Atlantic that you could get rich just selling a promise about the future.
所以，现在就点击订阅，这样你就不会错过这件事的后续发展，因为它即将变得更加离奇。于是，大西洋两岸都传开了消息说你可以变得富有仅仅靠贩卖一个关于未来的承诺。
And once people realized that some of them stopped waiting to ensure things they actually owned. Chapter 2. When insurance was a casino. Now almost nobody knows this part of the early history of insurance.
而一旦人们意识到这一点有些人就不再等着去确保他们实际拥有的东西。第二章。当保险还是赌场时。现在几乎没有人知道保险早期历史的这一部分。
For about a hundred years you didn't have to own a ship to ensure it. You could walk into a coffee house in London, pick up a ship you'd never seen that was carrying cargo that wasn't yours, sailing to a port you would never visit, and buy a policy, betting it would sink.
大约一百年来你不需要拥有一艘船来确保这一点。你可以走进伦敦的一家咖啡馆，为一艘你从未见过的船投保那艘船载着的不是你的货物，驶向一个你永远不会去的港口，然后买一份保单，赌它会沉没。
If it made it home safe, you lost your money. But if it went down in a storm, you collected a payout on a disaster that had nothing to do with you. And people did the same thing with human lives.
如果它安全返航，你就输了钱。但如果船在风暴中沉没，你就能因一场灾难获得赔付而这场灾难与你毫无关系。人们对人命也做了同样的事。
You could take out a policy on a stranger's death. a famous politician, a sick neighbor, anyone. And that is whack, right? Pure gambling dressed up in insurance paperwork. So, Parliament understandably shut it down.
你可以为陌生人的死亡投保。一位著名的政治家，一位生病的邻居，任何人。那太离谱了，对吧？纯粹是披着保险文书外衣的赌博。因此，议会理所当然地叫停了它。
A law in 1745 said that you could only insure a ship if you actually had real financial stake in it. A second law in 1774 did the same for people's lives. No more betting on a stranger's death and calling it insurance.
1745年的一项法律规定，你只能为一艘船投保，前提是你确实在其中拥有真实的经济利益。1774年的第二项法律对人们的生命也做出了同样的规定。不能再拿陌生人的死亡打赌还美其名曰保险。
Lawyers still call this rule insurable interest, and every US state still enforces some version of the same 1774 principle today. It's the exact same reason your neighbor can't take out a life insurance policy on you or a co-orker on you without you ever knowing.
律师至今仍称这一规则为保险利益，而且美国每个州至今仍在执行1774年这一原则的某种版本。这正是同样的道理你的邻居不能为你投保人寿保险或者同事为你投保，而你却毫不知情。
But banning the bedding only really solved half the problem. Real risk was still allowed, and real risk still needed a real price. Nobody had figured out how much a ship was actually worth insuring or how much a human life was actually worth insuring.
但禁止床上用品只真正解决了一半问题。真正的风险仍被允许，而真正的风险仍需付出真正的代价。没人弄清楚过一艘船究竟值多少保额或者一条人命究竟值多少保额。
Therefore, somebody had to sit down and actually do the math. Chapter 3. The comet man's death table. Now, the man who cracked this math is famous for something completely different.
因此，必须有人坐下来实际进行数学计算。第3章。彗星人的死亡表。如今，破解这个数学难题的人却因一件完全不同的事情而闻名。
Edmund Haley, the astronomer the comet is named after, spent time in the 1690s doing something much less glamorous than watching the sky. He got his hands on years of death records from a city called Brelau.
埃德蒙·哈雷，那颗彗星就是以这位天文学家的名字命名的，在17世纪90年代花了一些时间做着比仰望天空乏味得多的事情。他弄到了多年的死亡记录来自一个叫布雷斯劳的城市。
And for every age, 20, 40, 70, and every year between, he worked out the odds a person survived to their next birthday. And that was the first real life table in history. And it's still the basic idea behind every insurance price today.
而对于每个年龄，20、40、70，以及之间的每一年，他计算出了概率一个人活到下一个生日的概率。这就是历史上第一张真正的生命表。而它至今仍是当今每个保险价格背后的基本理念。
Turn a risk into a number and charge based on that number. Modern insurance companies do this at massive scale and it still doesn't always work out the way they planned. Watch what happened to three of America's biggest insurers in back-to-back years.
将风险转化为一个数字，并根据这个数字收费。现代保险公司大规模地这样做但结果仍然不总是如他们所计划的那样。看看美国三家最大的保险公司发生了什么在连续几年里。
In 2023, State Farm lost $14.1 billion just on the insurance itself before counting anything it made investing. All State was paying out more in claims than it collected in premiums.
2023年，州立农业保险公司仅保险业务就亏损了141亿美元仅保险业务本身还未计入其投资所得的任何收益。全州保险公司支付的理赔金额超过了其收取的保费。
Then 2024 flipped completely. State Farm's loss got cut in half. All State swung from losing money to real profit. Progressives profit more than doubled. The same companies, same math.
随后2024年形势完全逆转。State Farm的亏损减少了一半。All State从亏损转为实际盈利。Progressive的利润增长了一倍多。同样的公司，同样的算法。
One year the bet goes badly and the next year it goes great. That's not the companies getting smarter overnight. No, it's the actual cost of fixing cars and rebuilding houses swinging up and down faster than the price of a policy could ever keep up.
一年赌注结果很糟，第二年却很好。并不是公司一夜之间变聪明了。不，这是修车和重建房屋的实际成本在不断上下波动速度快过保单价格所能跟上的程度。
But one part of this doesn't add up here. State Farm lost 14.1 billion on the insurance itself in 2023. So it should have ended that year poorer, but instead its total net worth grew from about $135 billion to about 145 billion.
但这里面有一部分对不上。2023年，State Farm在保险业务本身亏损了141亿。所以按理说那一年它应该更穷了，但相反，它的总净值从大约1350亿美元增长到大约1450亿美元。
A company loses $14 billion on its main business and somehow gets richer anyway. So, the real money must be hiding somewhere other than the pricing, right? Somewhere in the gap between the moment you pay and the moment, if it ever comes, the company has to pay you back.
一家公司在其主营业务上亏损140亿美元却不知怎么反而变得更富有了。所以，真正的钱一定藏在定价以外的某个地方，对吧？在你付款的那一刻与那个时刻之间的某个空隙里，如果它真的到来的话，公司必须把钱还给你。
Chapter 4, the secret river. Now, when you pay a premium, the insurance company doesn't hand that money off to a claims adjuster and forget about it. Now, it usually sits there for months, sometimes years.
第四章，秘密之河。现在，当你支付保费时，保险公司并不会把那笔钱交给理赔理算员然后就不管了。现在，它通常会在那里存放数月，有时甚至数年。
All of that money sitting in the company's accounts waiting to become a claim someday has a name in the industry. It's called float. And one man figured out this pile of waiting money was worth more than the insurance business itself.
所有这些钱都躺在公司账户里等待着有一天成为一项索赔，这在业内有个名字。它被称为浮存金。而一个人发现这笔等待中的资金价值超过了保险业务本身。
Warren Buffett has explained it plainly in his own letters to shareholders. Float acts like a loan, except nobody's charging him interest on it. Nobody's telling him when he has to pay it back.
沃伦·巴菲特在他的致股东信中已经清楚地解释了这一点。浮存金就像一笔贷款，只不过没有人向他收取利息。没人告诉他什么时候必须还钱。
And if his insurance companies break even or turn a small profit on the policies themselves, well, that loan effectively costs him nothing at all. Now, 20 years ago, Buffett's insurance companies were holding about 46 billion a float.
如果他的保险公司收支平衡或者这些保单本身还能带来一点利润，那么这笔贷款实际上对他来说没有任何成本。而在20年前，巴菲特的保险公司持有约460亿美元的浮存金。
By the end of 2024, that number was 171 billion. And across those same 20 years, the insurance side of his business didn't even lose money doing it. made $32 billion in profit on top of holding all that cash.
到2024年底，这个数字达到了1710亿。而在这同样的20年里，他业务中的保险部分做这件事甚至没有亏钱。在持有所有这些现金的基础上还赚了320亿利润。
He took a business that most people find boring, Geico car insurance, and use the river of premiums flowing through it to buy stakes in Coca-Cola, Apple, and American Express, years before any of that premium money ever had to go back out the door as a claim.
他接手了一个大多数人觉得枯燥的生意，Geico汽车保险，并利用其中流淌的保费之河买入可口可乐、苹果和美国运通的股份，早在这些保费中的任何一笔钱作为理赔款流出之前。
And a quick fact since we're already here, with all of that float, you would assume that Berkshire Hathaway is the single biggest insurance company on the planet. But it isn't. Not by total assets.
既然我们都已经说到这里了，顺便说一个冷知识，拥有那么多浮存金，你可能会以为伯克希尔·哈撒韦是全球最大的保险公司。但事实并非如此。按总资产算并不是。
That title belongs to a German company called Alliance, holding just over a trillion dollars in assets. A Chinese company called Ping comes second. Berkshire sits at third, right behind them with China Life and the French insurer AXA rounding out the top five.
这个头衔属于一家名为安联的德国公司，其资产刚刚超过一万亿美元。一家名为平安的中国公司位居第二。伯克希尔位列第三，紧随其后的是中国人寿以及法国保险公司安盛，共同构成了前五名。
Buffett didn't need to own the biggest insurance company in the world. No, he just had to run his slice of it better than the companies above him. Not everyone who tried this trick pulled it off, though.
巴菲特并不需要拥有世界上最大的保险公司。不，他只需将自己那部分业务经营得比比他更靠前的公司更好。不过，并非每个尝试这一招的人都成功了。
AIG spent decades as the largest insurer on the planet, built the same way on careful math and a patient float. Then one small division inside the company started making side bets that had nothing to do with real insurance math and complicated contracts tied to mortgage bonds.
AIG曾数十年间是全球最大的保险公司，同样建立在精密的计算和耐心的浮存金之上。然而公司内部一个小部门开始进行附带押注，这些押注与真正的保险精算毫无关系，还有与抵押债券挂钩的复杂合约。
When the housing market collapsed in 2008, those side bets all blew up at once, and the US government had to step in with a bailout north of $180 billion just to stop the damage from spreading to the rest of the economy.
当2008年房地产市场崩溃时，那些旁注赌注全部同时爆仓，美国政府不得不介入提供超过1800亿美元的救助仅仅是为了阻止损害蔓延到经济的其他部分。
One man used that river of cash to build one of the largest fortunes in history. Another company nearly used the same river to sink the entire financial system. The float itself doesn't care which one happens.
一个人利用这条现金之河建立了历史上最大的财富之一。另一家公司差点用同样的河流沉没整个金融体系。浮标本身并不关心哪一种会发生。
It just depends on who is steering the boat. But even the most disciplined captain can out steer everything. A single hurricane, one bad year can drain a company's entire float in an afternoon, no matter how carefully it was invested.
这完全取决于谁在驾驶这艘船。但即使是最自律的船长也能超越一切。一场飓风，一个糟糕的年份就能在一个下午耗尽一家公司的全部浮存金，无论其投资多么谨慎。
Which is why the smartest people in this industry didn't just protect their float. No, they built an entire second industry whose only job is protecting the first one from the one disaster big enough to drain it dry.
这就是为什么这个行业里最聪明的人不只是保护他们的浮存金。不，他们建立了一个完整的第二产业，其唯一职责就是保护第一个产业免受那一场灾难大到足以将其彻底耗尽。
Chapter 5. Insurance for the insurers. Now, a hurricane obviously doesn't care about anyone's spreadsheet. If one insurer wrote too many home policies along the same stretch of coastline, a single bad storm season could wipe out the whole company.
第五章。为保险公司提供保险。如今，飓风显然不在乎任何人的电子表格。如果一家保险公司在同一段海岸线上承保了过多的房屋保单，一个恶劣的风暴季就可能让整个公司覆灭。
So, insurance companies do exactly what you do. They buy insurance, too. It's called reinsurance, and it moves an amount of money that most people would never guess. In 2024 alone, reinsurance companies collected $394.7 billion in premiums worldwide.
所以，保险公司做的正是你所做的事。它们也购买保险。它被称为再保险，它转移的资金数额大多数人根本想象不到。仅在2024年，再保险公司就收取了3947亿美元的全球保费。
The single biggest company in that world is a German company called Munich, holding roughly one out of every $10 in the entire global market. Right behind it is Swiss Ree, Berkshire Hathway's own reinsurance division and one name you've already met, Lloyds of London.
这个领域最大的单一公司是一家名为慕尼黑的德国公司，大约持有全球市场中每10美元中的1美元。紧随其后的是瑞士再保险，伯克希尔·哈撒韦旗下的再保险部门，以及一个你已经见过的名字，伦敦劳合社。
And one number puts all of this into perspective. Globally, insurance companies collect more than $7 trillion a year in premiums. According to the reinsurer, Swiss re's own research arm.
而一个数字就能让这一切一目了然。在全球范围内，保险公司每年收取超过7万亿美元的保费。据再保险公司瑞士再保险自己的研究部门称。
Do the math on that and it works out to roughly $220,000 flowing into the industry every single second, day and night. While I am reading this sentence to you, most of it becomes float before it ever becomes a claim.
算一算就知道，这相当于每秒钟约有22万美元流入该行业，日夜不停。当我向你朗读这句话时，其中大部分在成为索赔之前就变成了浮存金。
Now, do you remember that coffee house from chapter 2 where people were betting on ships they didn't own? Well, that same coffee house run by a man named Edward Lloyd eventually turned into a real marketplace where merchants pulled their money to cover a ship's cargo together.
现在，你还记得第二章里的那家咖啡馆吗人们在那里对不属于他们的船只下注？嗯，那家由一位名叫爱德华·劳埃德的人经营的同一家咖啡馆最终变成了一个真正的市场商人们在那里凑钱共同为船只的货物提供保障。
So, no single backer got wiped out by one storm. And that habit never went away. For centuries, whenever a Lloyd's insured ship sank, the news was announced by ringing an actual bell salvaged from a wrecked ship called the Luteine.
这样，就不会有任何一个出资人因一场风暴而倾家荡产。而这个习惯从未消失。几个世纪以来，每当劳合社承保的船只沉没，消息都是通过敲响一口真正的钟来宣布的，这口钟是从一艘名为卢泰恩号的失事船只上打捞来的。
One ring for bad news, two for good. And that bell still hangs inside Lloyd's headquarters today. So the full chain looks like this. You pay your insurer. Your insurer pays a slice of that to a reinsurer in case one bad year hits everyone at once.
一声钟响代表坏消息，两声代表好消息。如今，那口钟依然悬挂在劳合社总部内。所以，完整的链条是这样的。你向你的保险公司付款。你的保险公司会将其中的一部分支付给再保险公司以防某一年糟糕的年份同时打击所有人。
That reinsurer might pass part of the risk along again to other reinsurers until a single house fire in your town ends up backed by a global web of money stretching back to a 400-year-old coffee house tradition that you'd never heard of.
那家再保险公司可能会将部分风险再次转嫁给其他再保险公司直到你们镇上的一场房屋火灾最终由一张全球性的资金网络支撑，而这网络可追溯到一项有400年历史的咖啡馆传统而你从未听说过。
And that whole chain runs on trust. Every insurer, every reinssurer, every syndicate at Lloyds is trusting that the claim on the other end of the line is real. But wherever that much money moves on trust, somebody eventually tests how far they can push it.
而整条链条都靠信任运转。每一家保险公司，每一家再保险公司，劳合社的每一个承保辛迪加都相信电话另一端的索赔是真实的。但只要有这么多钱靠信任流动，最终总会有人试探自己能把它推到多远。
Chapter 5b, the company that invented 60,000 people. So, in the early 1970s, a Los Angeles company called Equity Funding Corporation of America was one of the 10 largest life insurers in the country.
第5b章，发明了6万人的公司。所以，在20世纪70年代初，一家位于洛杉矶的名为美国权益融资公司是全美十大寿险公司之一。
Wall Street loved it. Its stock kept climbing and almost none of it was real. Executives at Equity Funding were writing life insurance policies on people who didn't exist. Fake medical exams, fake applications, fake names pulled out of thin air, all typed up to look like real customers.
华尔街对它青睐有加。它的股价持续攀升，而其中几乎全是虚假的。Equity Funding的高管们在为人寿保险保单做承保对象却是根本不存在的人。伪造的体检，伪造的申请，凭空捏造的假名字，全部打出来，装得像真实客户一样。
Then the company sold those fake policies to reinsurers for cash. The same reinsurance system from the last chapter, except this time the risk being insured was a lie from the start.
然后公司把这些假保单卖给了再保险公司换取现金。和上一章相同的再保险体系，只不过这次被投保的风险从一开始就是个谎言。
Running a fake insurance company took real money. So the fraud had to keep growing just to survive. Employees held after hours parties where they invented fresh fake customers on index cards to keep the scheme breathing for another quarter.
经营一家假保险公司需要真金白银。因此，这场骗局为了生存，不得不持续扩张。员工们在加班后举行聚会他们在索引卡上编造新的虚假客户以维持骗局再撑过一个季度。
When a few of those fake people needed to die to trigger a payout, the company faked their deaths, too. By the time it collapsed in 1973, equity funding had created more than 60,000 fake policies.
当其中一些虚构人物需要死亡以触发赔付时，公司伪造了他们的死亡，同样如此。到1973年倒闭时，股票融资已制造了超过6万份虚假保单。
a former employee and a Wall Street analyst who smelled something wrong. They finally blew the whistle. The stock was suspended and the company collapsed into bankruptcy within weeks.
一名前员工和一位华尔街分析师察觉到了不对劲。他们最终揭发了此事。股票停牌，公司在几周内宣告破产。
72 people were eventually charged. The man who ran the company pleaded guilty and served 4 years in prison. An entire life insurance company built almost wholly out of paperwork for people who never lived sat inside of America's 10 biggest insurers before anyone caught it.
最终有72人被起诉。经营该公司的男子认罪并在监狱服刑4年。一整家寿险公司几乎完全由文书工作构建而成为从未存在过的人而设跻身美国十大保险公司之列在任何人察觉之前。
If you can fake the paperwork well enough, insurance fraud doesn't happen at the edges of the industry. No, it can happen at the very top of it. Fraud at the top looks like index cards and fake names, but fraud at street level, well, that looks a lot more like fire.
如果你能把文书伪造得足够逼真，保险欺诈并非发生在行业的边缘。不，它可以发生在行业的最顶端。顶层的欺诈看起来像索引卡和假名，但街头层面的欺诈，嗯，那看起来更像是火。
Chapter 5C. The buildings that burned themselves rich. Now, through the 1970s and into the 1980s, the South Bronx in New York City was on fire so often that firefighters clocked an average of 15 calls an hour.
第5C章。那些烧火致富的建筑。从20世纪70年代到80年代，纽约市南布朗克斯区频繁发生火灾，消防员平均每小时接到15次报警。
Whole blocks burned down. An estimated 250,000 people lost their homes. Now, some of that was poverty and neglect. But a lot of it was a business model. Banks and insurers had already written off large parts of the neighborhood as too risky to lend or insure fairly, a practice called redlinining.
整个街区被烧毁。估计有25万人失去了家园。现在，其中一些是贫困和忽视造成的。但其中很多是一种商业模式。银行和保险公司早已将该社区的大部分地区划为风险过高、无法公平贷款或承保的区域，这种做法被称为红线划界。
And that left landlords holding buildings that nobody wanted to buy at a fair price. So, a network of middlemen figured out a workaround. Buy a rundown building for cheap, resell it to a shell company at an inflated price, then resell it again.
这让房东们手里握着一些楼房没人愿意以公平价格买下。于是，一个中间人网络想出了一个变通办法。低价买下一栋破旧的楼，再以虚高的价格转卖给一家空壳公司，然后再转卖一次。
Each sale on paper pushing the value higher. Insure the building for that inflated number with real insurers. Sometimes even Lloyds of London. Sometimes the same New York fair plan built to cover buildings that nobody else would touch.
每一次纸面上的交易都推高了价值。按那个虚高的数字为大楼投保找真正的保险公司。有时甚至是伦敦劳合社。有时同样的纽约博览会计划用来覆盖建筑物别人都不愿碰的。
Strip anything valuable out of that building, then burn it to the ground and collect. One Brooklyn landlord named Imray Oberlander was caught after collecting roughly $125,000, worth well over $700,000 today from 21 separate fires between 1970 and 1975 alone.
把那栋楼里任何值钱的东西都拆走，然后一把火烧掉并收钱。布鲁克林一位名叫伊姆雷·奥伯兰德的房东被抓在收取了大约125,000美元后，按今天的价值远超700,000美元，来自21起独立的火灾仅1970年至1975年间。
And he was not unique. He was just one of many people running the same math in the same decade. Two completely different types of insurance fraud a decade apart on opposite ends of the country's class ladder.
而他并非个例。他只是众多人中的一个在同一十年里做着同样的算计。两种完全不同的保险欺诈相隔十年位于这个国家阶级阶梯的两端。
One dressed up in a suit and index cards, one dressed up in a gasoline and a match, but both worked off the exact same weakness. An industry built on trusting that the claim on the other end of the line is real.
一个穿着西装，拿着索引卡，一个带着汽油和火柴，但两者都利用了完全相同的弱点。一个建立在信任之上的行业，相信电话另一端的说法是真实的。
And all of this works fine for houses, buildings, and fake paperwork. Things that can be inflated, faked, or replaced. But it gets a lot more personal and a lot darker the moment the thing being priced stops being property and starts being you.
而所有这些对于房子、建筑和伪造文件都行得通。可以被夸大、伪造或替代的东西。但一旦涉及个人，就会变得更加私密，也更加黑暗就在那被定价之物不再被视为财产，而开始被视为你自身的那一刻。
Chapter 6. The machine that says no. Now, health insurance runs on the same underwriting math as everything you've just learned. Collect premiums, pay out some claims, keep the rest.
第六章。那个说不的机器。现在，健康保险运行在与你刚刚学到的完全相同的核保数学之上。收取保费，赔付部分索赔，留下其余部分。
The only difference is what's being priced. Your body, not your car. For most of American history, this isn't even how healthcare worked. During World War II, the government froze wages to control inflation.
唯一的区别在于被定价的是什么。你的身体，而不是你的车。在美国历史的大部分时间里，医疗保健甚至都不是这样运作的。在第二次世界大战期间，政府冻结了工资以控制通货膨胀。
Companies desperate for workers couldn't offer higher pay, so they started offering health coverage instead since that wasn't covered by the freeze. A wartime accounting trick from the 1940s is the direct ancestor of the health plan sitting in your paycheck today.
急需工人的公司无法提供更高的工资，于是他们转而开始提供健康保险，因为这不属于冻结范围。20世纪40年代的一项战时会计技巧正是直接前身也就是如今躺在你工资单里的那份健康计划。
And one number here should actually scare you, and it's the same one we open this video with. In 2024, health insurers denied 19 out of every 100 in network medical claims. Out of network, they denied 37 out of 100.
而这里有一个数字实际上应该让你感到恐惧，它也正是我们本期视频开头所用的那个数字。2024年，健康保险公司每100份网络内医疗索赔中拒绝了19份。在网络外，他们每100份中拒绝了37份。
And fewer than one out of every 100 people who got denied ever bothered to appeal it. Of the small number who did fight back, the insurance company reviewed its own decision and agreed with itself two out of three times.
而在每100个被拒绝的人中，只有不到1人曾费心去提出申诉。在少数确实反击的人中，保险公司重新审视了自己的决定并且三次中有两次同意了自己。
I mean, think about what that means. The system is built assuming you won't push back, and most people don't. Doctors see this from the other side every single day. A 2025 survey of physicians found that 95 out of 100 said prior authorization rules, so the paperwork required before an insurer will ever approve a treatment, delay care their patients actually need.
我是说，想想这意味着什么。这个系统建立的前提是假设你不会反击，而大多数人确实不会。医生们每天都会从另一面看到这种情况。一项2025年的医生调查发现100人中有95人表示，事先授权规则，也就是所需的文书工作，在保险公司批准治疗之前，延误了患者真正需要的护理。
79% said that patients just give up on treatment because the process is too hard. 26% said a prior authorization denial led to a real medical emergency for one of their patients. A hospital stay, permanent harm, or worse.
79%的人表示，患者干脆放弃治疗因为这个过程太难了。26%的人表示，一次事先授权被拒导致了一名患者发生真正的医疗紧急情况。住院、永久性伤害，甚至更糟。
That's a paperwork delay turning into a body count. And it's coming from the doctor's own mouths, not a critic on the outside. Just walk through what that looks like on a random Tuesday.
这就是文书延误演变成死亡人数。而且这话是医生们亲口说的，不是外界的批评者说的。就来看看这在某个普通的周二是什么样子。
A doctor orders an MRI for a patient in pain, but that order doesn't go straight to the imaging center. No, it goes to someone at the insurance company first. Someone who has never met the patient, checking it against a list, approved, denied, or we need more information, which usually just means denied with extra paperwork.
一位医生为一位疼痛的患者开了核磁共振检查，但这个医嘱并不会直接送到影像中心。不，它会先送到保险公司的某个人那里。一个从未见过病人的人，对照清单进行核对，批准、拒绝，或者我们需要更多信息，而这通常只意味着拒绝，外加额外的文书工作。
The patient waits, but the pain doesn't. In the last 2 years, this got even stranger. A lawsuit filed against United Health in 2023 claims the company used a computer program called NH Predict to decide when elderly patients in rehab should be cut off from coverage and that staff were pushed to keep denials within 1% of whatever the program predicted, knowing that almost none of those patients would ever appeal.
病人在等待，但疼痛不会。在过去两年里，这件事变得更加离奇。2023年对联合健康提起的一项诉讼称该公司使用了一个名为NH Predict的计算机程序来决定何时应停止对接受康复治疗的老年患者的承保并且员工被迫将拒赔率控制在该程序预测结果的1%以内，因为他们知道这些患者中几乎没有人会提出上诉。
a separate lawsuit against Sigma claims. Its review system lets staff reject over 300,000 claims in just two months, spending an average of about 1 second on each case without opening a single patient file.
另一起针对Sigma的诉讼称。其审核系统让员工在短短两个月内拒绝了超过30万份索赔申请，平均每份案件仅花费约1秒钟，甚至没有打开过一份患者档案。
Now, both cases are still in court, and the companies dispute parts of how they're described, but the allegations themselves are now sitting in front of a judge. And the uncomfortable truth sits beneath all of it.
目前，这两起案件仍在法庭审理中，相关公司对部分描述提出异议，但这些指控本身如今已摆在法官面前。而令人不安的真相就潜藏在这一切之下。
The bestrun insurance company by the numbers Wall Street actually cares about is the one that controls to the dollar how much of your premium is allowed to walk back out the door, whether or not that's the same company that treated you the best while you were sick.
按数字计算表现最好的保险公司华尔街真正关心的是那家精确到美元地控制着你的保费中有多少被允许流回门外，无论那是不是同一家公司在你生病时对你最好的那家。
Health insurance is built to manage you while you're alive and fighting for coverage. But eventually, the fighting stops for everyone. So, the industry built a separate policy for that exact moment.
健康保险的设计就是为了管理你在你活着并争取保险覆盖的时候。但最终，对每个人来说，抗争都会停止。所以，行业针对那个特定时刻，制定了单独的政策。
One when you're not around to fight for anything at all. Chapter 7. The policy designed to outlast you. Now, life insurance comes in two main flavors sold with almost identical pitches that work completely differently underneath.
一个当你不在场，根本无法争取任何东西的时刻。第七章。这项政策旨在比你更长久。现在，人寿保险主要有两种类型以几乎相同的推销话术出售，但内在运作方式却完全不同。
Now, term life is simple. You pay for a number of years, say 20 or 30, and if you die in that window, your family gets paid. If you don't, the policy just ends. Nothing is owed back to you.
现在，定期人寿保险很简单。你支付一定年限的费用，比如20年或30年，如果你在这个期间内去世，你的家人会获得赔付。如果你没有去世，保单就终止了。不会退还给你任何费用。
One question people search for constantly though is does a policy still pay out if someone takes their own life? And every standard life insurance contract includes a suicide clause built for exactly this scenario and it exists specifically to prevent anyone from buying a policy as a shortcut for their family.
人们不断搜索的一个问题是，如果一个人自杀保单还会赔付吗？而每一份标准的人寿保险合同都包含一项自杀条款正是为这种情况而设它的存在专门是为了防止任何人为了给家人留条捷径而购买保单。
For roughly the first 2 years after a policy starts, suicide voids the death benefit completely, and the insurer typically refunds only the premiums paid and not the payout. But after that 2-year window closes, the policy treats it like any other cause of death and pays in full.
在保单生效后的头两年左右，自杀会导致身故保险金完全失效，保险公司通常只退还已缴纳的保费，而不支付赔偿金。但两年期限一过，保单便将其视同其他任何死因，并全额赔付。
Insurers built that 2-year rule, and they investigate every early claim hard, precisely so this can't be used as a plan. And look, if you or anyone you know is struggling with thoughts like this, please reach out to a crisis line or someone you trust, this is one clause, not a strategy.
保险公司设立这条两年规则，并且会严格调查每一宗早期索赔，正是为了防止这被当作一种计划。而且，如果你或你认识的任何人正被这样的念头困扰，请拨打危机热线或联系你信任的人，这只是一个条款，不是一种策略。
Whole life policies never end as long as you keep paying. And it builds up something called cash value that you can supposedly borrow against later on. It also costs a lot more, often 5 to 10 times more than term life insurance for the same payout.
终身寿险只要你持续缴费就永远不会终止。而且它会积累一种叫做现金价值的东西据说你以后可以以此为抵押借款。它的费用也高得多，通常是同样赔付额的定期寿险的5到10倍。
Now, take two people shopping for the same amount of coverage, half a million. A healthy 35-year-old might pay around $30 a month for term. For whole life, that same person might pay $300 to $500 a month for life.
现在，假设两个人要购买相同保额的保险，五十万。一个健康的35岁的人每月可能只需支付约30美元的定期寿险保费。对于终身寿险，同一个人可能每月支付300到500美元，持续终身。
A big chunk of that gap goes toward building a cash pile. The insurance company gets to invest, not for more protection, for the float trick from a few chapters back, except now the premium is coming out of your paycheck instead of Berkshire Hathaway's bank account.
这一差额的很大一部分用于积累现金。保险公司得以进行投资，不是为了获得更多保障，而是为了利用前面几章提到的浮存金技巧，只不过现在保费是从你的工资中扣除，而不是从伯克希尔·哈撒韦的银行账户中扣除。
So, why do many agents push the expensive option? Well, follow the money. Reports across the industry consistently say permanent policies pay agents a much bigger commission than term.
那么，为什么很多agent会推荐昂贵的选项呢？嗯，跟着钱走。整个行业的报告一致表明永久性保单支付给agent的佣金远高于定期保单。
Often, most of your entire first year's premium compared to a smaller cut on term. And no regulator publishes one clean chart proving the exact number, but nobody in the industry disputes the direction either.
通常，你第一年保费的大部分相比更小的定期保险的削减。而且没有监管机构发布一张清晰的图表证明确切的数字，但业内也没有人否认这一趋势。
The expensive policy pays the person selling it more. Now look at what people actually do with these policies over time. Whole life policies stay active 94% of the time. Term policies only stay active 89% of the time.
昂贵的保单让销售它的人赚得更多。现在看看人们实际上是怎么做的随着时间推移，这些保单的表现如何。终身寿险保单在94%的时间里保持有效。定期寿险保单仅在89%的时间里保持有效。
And worse, a huge chunk of people quit right when their guaranteed price ends and the real costs finally show up. Put it together and term is the cheap honest version built for one job.
更糟糕的是，很大一部分人会在他们的保证价格结束时退出而真正的费用终于显现出来。综合来看，定期寿险是廉价而诚实的版本专为一件事而设。
Protect your family if you die too soon. It also pays your agent the least and it's the version that people are most likely to walk away from before it's ever needed. Whole life keeps you locked in for decades.
如果你过早离世，保护你的家人。它支付给agent的佣金也最少，而且它是那种人们最有可能在真正需要之前就放弃的版本。终身寿险会把你锁定几十年。
Pays your agent well upfront and builds a pile of your money that the company gets to invest while you keep paying into it. And for most people asking, "How do I protect my family for the least money?"
前期支付给agent丰厚的佣金，并积累起一大笔你的钱公司可以用这笔钱进行投资，而你则持续缴费。对于大多数人问的，“我怎样才能以最少的钱保护我的家人？”
Well, term wins easily. But remember that cash pile whole life builds up. An entirely different kind of buyer isn't shopping for cheap protection. Now they're shopping for exactly that cash pile and everything it can do for them later on.
嗯，定期寿险轻松胜出。但请记住，终身寿险会积累起那笔现金。一种完全不同的买家并不是在寻找便宜的保障。现在他们正在寻找的正是那堆现金以及它日后能为他们做的一切。
Chapter 7B. The rich side of the same contract. Now, this is the answer to the second promise from the very start of this video. How the ultra rich flip the same industry around. It's the part of the industry a regular buyer almost never sees.
第7B章。同一份合同的富裕面。现在，这就是第二个承诺的答案从最开始在这个视频中。超级富豪如何颠覆同一个行业。这是行业的一部分普通买家几乎从未见过。
Built for someone who already has money and wants to grow it without the tax bill everyone else pays. So start with the cash value sitting inside a whole life permanent policy. The same pile of money we just called a bad deal for most people.
为已有资金的人量身打造并希望在不承担其他人所缴税款的情况下实现增长。所以从现金价值开始存在于终身寿险永久保单中。就是我们刚刚称之为糟糕交易的那同一笔钱对大多数人来说。
That pile grows tax deferred year after year. Instead of withdrawing it, which can trigger tax, the owner simply borrows against it. A policy loan isn't counted as income, so it isn't taxed as income.
这笔资金逐年增长，税款递延。与其将其取出，这可能触发税务，持有人只需以其作为抵押借款。保单贷款不计为收入，因此不作为收入征税。
When the owner eventually dies, the death benefit pays off whatever is left of the loan, and the rest still lands with the family completely tax-free. Under the same federal rule, that makes every death benefit tax-free to begin with.
当保单持有人最终去世时，身故赔偿金会偿还贷款剩余的全部金额，而其余部分仍会完全免税地留给家人。根据同样的联邦规定，这使得所有身故赔偿金从一开始就免税。
Money grows for decades, gets spent along the way through borrowing, and never gets taxed at any step. Try doing that with a regular brokerage account. This whole approach has a name in wealth circles, becoming your own bank.
资金增长数十年，期间通过借款方式支取使用，并且在任何环节都无需缴税。用普通经纪账户试试看。这种方法在财富圈里有个名字，成为你自己的银行。
And actually, a businessman named Nelson Nash wrote a book about it in the 1980s called Becoming Your Own Banker. And the pitch is simple. Instead of borrowing from a bank and paying it interest, you borrow from your own policy and pay yourself back on your own terms while the full cash value keeps earning inside the policy the whole time.
实际上，一位名叫纳尔逊·纳什的商人在20世纪80年代写了一本关于它的书，叫做《成为你自己的银行家》。这个方案很简单。不用向银行借钱并支付利息，而是从你自己的保单中借款，然后按你自己的条件还给自己，同时全部现金价值仍在保单内持续增值，始终如此。
Plenty of financial adviserss push back hard on this one. And it's worth hearing why. The strategy only works because the underlying policy is whole life, the same expensive high commission product from a few minutes ago.
许多理财顾问对此强烈反对。这值得听听原因。这个策略之所以有效，是因为底层保单是终身寿险，就是几分钟前提到的同一种昂贵的高佣金产品。
So you are paying a premium for the privilege of lending yourself money. For some with the discipline and the income to fund a large policy for years before touching it, well, this can work exactly as designed.
所以你是在支付额外费用，换取向自己借钱的资格。对于某些拥有纪律和收入的人来说能够多年为一项大额保单提供资金而不动用它，那么，这完全可以按设计运作。
For most people though, the extra cost baked into the policy eats away a good chunk of what makes the strategy appealing in the first place. Then there's the move built specifically for estate tax.
然而对大多数人来说，保单中内含的额外成本会侵蚀掉很大一部分最初让这一策略具有吸引力的因素。此外还有专门为遗产税设计的操作。
Federal law lets an individual pass up to $15 million or $30 million for a married couple to their heirs tax-free as of 2026. Anything above that gets taxed at 40%. So instead of owning a life insurance policy personally, a wealthy family sets up a trust called an irrevocable life insurance trust and has the trust own the policy from day one.
联邦法律允许个人最多将1500万美元或已婚夫妇3000万美元免税传给继承人截至2026年。超过该额度的部分按40%征税。因此，富裕家庭不会以个人名义持有寿险保单，而是设立一种信托，称为不可撤销人寿保险信托，并让该信托从第一天起就持有保单。
The family funds it every year using a legal quirk called a crew letter, which technically gives beneficiaries a short window to withdraw the gift just long enough to qualify it for an annual tax-free gift limit, even though nobody actually withdraws it.
家族每年都会为其提供资金利用一项被称为“船员信函”的法律漏洞，这在技术上为受益人提供了一个短暂的窗口期可以提取这笔赠与时间刚好足够长使其符合年度免税赠与限额，尽管实际上没有人会提取它。
Because the trust owns the policy and not the person, the death benefit never counts as part of the taxable estate at all. A multi-million dollar payout completely untouched by the 40% estate tax that would otherwise be waiting to take a chunk.
因为保单的所有者是信托而非个人，身故赔偿金完全不会被计入应税遗产。数百万美元的赔付金完全未被动用因为40%的遗产税否则这笔税早就等着分走一大块了。
Now, the boldest version of this loops all the way back to Buffett. Instead of buying insurance from someone else, a business owner can start their own insurance company just to ensure their own business.
现在，这种做法最大胆的版本要一路追溯到巴菲特。与其向别人购买保险，企业主可以创办自己的保险公司只为保障自己的企业。
It's called a captive. And under a rule called section 831b, a small captive insurance company can collect close to $3 million a year in premium and pay tax only on its investment income, not on the underwriting profit itself.
这被称为自保公司。根据一项名为831b条款的规定，一家小型自保保险公司每年可以收取近300万美元的保费并且只需为其投资收入纳税，而无需为承保利润本身纳税。
The business gets a deduction for the premiums it pays, while the owner's own company gets to hold the float. The same river of cash Buffett discovered at Geico, just built at scale that one family can run instead of a scale only a conglomerate can run.
企业可以就其支付的保费获得扣除，而所有者自己的公司则得以持有这笔浮存金。巴菲特在Geico发现的那条相同的现金流之河，如今已实现规模化，一个家族就能运营，而不是只有大型企业集团才能运营的规模。
Now, one honest warning before you get any ideas here. The IRS has been cracking down hard on this last one. In January 2025, new federal rules officially labeled the most aggressive versions of these small captives as listed transactions, meaning the government now treats them as presumptively abusive tax shelters unless they can prove they're pricing real risks the same way a real insurance company would.
现在，在你产生任何想法之前，有一个诚实的警告。美国国税局一直在严厉打击最后这一项。2025年1月，新的联邦法规正式将这些小型自保公司中最具侵略性的版本列为上市交易，这意味着政府现在将它们视为推定具有滥用性质的避税工具，除非它们能证明自己是在为真实风险定价，就像一家真正的保险公司那样。
The line between a legitimate captive and an illegal tax dodge, well, it comes down to one thing. Does the company actually behave like an insurer pricing real risk and sometimes paying real claims or does it just exist to move money out of reach of the IRS?
合法自保与非法避税之间的界限，归根结底在于一点。这家公司是否真的像保险公司一样运作，为真实风险定价，有时赔付真实的索赔，还是仅仅为了转移资金，使其脱离国税局的管辖范围？
You get that wrong and instead of playing Buffett's playbook, you've built yourself an audit. Now, this is not financial or legal advice. And every one of these strategies needs a real attorney and a real accountant before anyone touches them.
如果你搞错了这一点，那么你非但没有效仿巴菲特的策略，反而给自己招来了一场审计。现在，这不是财务或法律建议。这些策略中的每一个都需要一位真正的律师和一位真正的会计师，然后才能有人接触它们。
But the shape of it should be clear by now. The average person buys a policy, pays every month, and hopes to never collect. The wealthy buyer uses the same industry, sometimes that same exact policy, to borrow against it, shield it from estate tax, or become the insurer instead of the customer.
但它的轮廓现在应该已经清楚了。普通人买一份保单，每月缴费，只求永远不用理赔。富有的买家利用同一个行业，有时甚至是完全相同的那份保单，用它来借款，规避遗产税，或者反过来成为承保人，而不是客户。
One contract, two completely different games being played on top of it. Now, if everything you've just heard made you want to see the actual playbook, the trust structures, the captive setup, the policy loan math laid out step by step instead of described out loud, well, that's exactly what's built into the Alux app.
同一份合同，上面却在进行着两场完全不同的游戏。现在，如果你刚才听到的一切让你想看看实际的行动手册，信托结构，受控设置，保单贷款计算逐步展开而不是口头描述，那么，这正是Alux应用中内置的内容。
Start your free trial at alux.com/app, then come straight back here because this story is not finished. Now, none of this matters if the very first step goes wrong, picking that policy in the first place.
在alux.com/app开始你的免费试用，然后直接回到这里因为这个故事还没有结束。现在，如果第一步就错了，这一切都无关紧要，那就是一开始就选错了保单。
Every one of these products from term, whole life, home, auto gets sold to you by somebody. Before you touch any of it, you need to know whose game that somebody is actually playing.
这些产品中的每一个，从定期寿险，终身寿险，到房屋保险，汽车保险，都是有人卖给你的。在你接触任何一项之前，你需要知道那个人实际在玩的是谁的游戏。
Chapter 8, the six week license and who it works for. Now, every agent who's ever sold you a policy answers to somebody, and it's worth knowing exactly who before you sign anything.
第八章，六周执照以及它为谁服务。现在，每个卖给你保单的agent都听命于某个人，在签署任何东西之前，弄清楚那个人是谁是值得的。
A captive agent works for one company only. Think of the local state farm or all-state office down the street. They get training and support from that one company, and in return, they can only sell you that company's products, whether or not it's actually your best option.
专属agent只为一家公司工作。想想本地的州立农场或者街对面的全州办公室。他们从那一家公司获得培训和支持，作为回报，他们只能向你出售那家公司的产品，无论那是否真的是你最好的选择。
An independent agent can shop your situation across several different companies. In exchange, they usually carry more of their own business costs, and they're the one deciding out of everything available which product to put in front of you first.
独立agent可以根据你的情况在多家不同公司之间进行比较。作为交换，他们通常承担更多自己的业务成本，而且是由他们从所有可选项中决定先将哪种产品摆在你面前。
Now, neither kind is automatically the bad guy here, but both run on the same basic fact. The person telling you what to buy is being paid by the company selling it, not by you. Something worth remembering the next time somebody tells you exactly what you need with total confidence.
现在，这两种类型本身都不是自动的坏人，但两者都基于同一个基本事实。告诉你该买什么的人是由销售它的公司付钱，而不是由你付钱。值得记住的事情下次有人非常确信地告诉你你需要什么时。
But agents don't sell policies out of charity, and getting the job is a lot easier than you'd guess for someone with your money on the line. Compare this job to nearly any other career that touches real money.
但agent卖保险可不是出于慈善，而得到这份工作比你想的要容易得多对于像你这样有自己钱在里面的人来说。把这份工作与几乎任何其他职业比较一下那些涉及真金白银的职业。
You don't need a college degree to sell insurance. In most states, you don't even need much time. A pre-licicensing course, an exam somewhere between $80 and $160 questions, depending on your state, a background check, and a few hundred in fees, usually just over $600 allin.
卖保险不需要大学文凭。在大多数州，你甚至不需要太多时间。一门预许可课程，一场考试，大约80到160道题，取决于你所在的州，一次背景调查，以及几百美元的费用，通常总共只需600美元出头。
And you can become a licensed agent inside of 6 weeks. No four-year degree, no internship, nothing close to what it takes to become a doctor or a lawyer standing between you and legally selling a product with your name on the commission check.
你可以在6周内成为一名持牌agent。无需四年学位，无需实习，几乎没有什么像成为医生或律师所需的条件阻碍你合法销售产品佣金支票上写着你的名字。
So, what that license actually pays depends entirely on which side of the industry you land on. A captive agent working a salary plus commission desk for a company like State Farm or Allstate typically starts modest, closer to a retail manager's income than a Wall Street Trader.
所以，那张执照实际能赚多少钱完全取决于你落在行业的哪一边。一名受雇的agent，在底薪加佣金的岗位上工作为State Farm或Allstate这样的公司效劳通常起步收入不高，更接近零售经理的收入，而非华尔街交易员。
An independent agent who spends years building their own book of clients can earn far more because eventually they're not selling one company's products anymore. No, they're selling access to dozens of them.
而一名独立agent，花费数年建立自己的客户名册，收入可以高得多，因为最终他们不再销售某一家公司的产品了。不，他们销售的是获取数十家公司产品的渠道。
And every renewal pays them again without any extra work. And there's also a second door into this industry that pays even better, but it's a lot harder to walk through. Actuaries are the people who literally build the death tables and pricing models this whole video has been describing since Edmund Haley.
而每一次续保都会再次向他们付款，无需任何额外工作。此外，进入这个行业还有第二扇门那扇门的收入甚至更高，但要穿过它难得多。精算师就是那些人他们正是构建死亡表以及整段视频一直在描述的定价模型的人自埃德蒙·哈雷以来。
And becoming one takes years of brutal sequential exams, sometimes a decade's worth, stacked on top of a mathheavy degree. But the average actuary in the United States earns somewhere around $141,000 a year, and experienced actuaries in specialized roles regularly clear over 200,000.
而要成为精算师，需要经历多年残酷的连续考试，有时长达十年之久，还要叠加在一个数学密集的学位之上。但美国精算师的平均年薪大约在141,000美元左右，而从事专业领域的资深精算师通常能超过200,000。
The industry hands out one of its highest paying jobs almost entirely on the basis of exams. Not connections or a fancy school, just whether you can pass the test. So, the entry-level door into insurance is nearly the cheapest, fastest professional license in the country.
这个行业给出的最高薪职位之一几乎完全是基于考试来决定的。不是人脉或名校，只是看你能否通过考试。所以，进入保险业的入门门槛几乎是全国最便宜、最快的职业执照。
The ceiling above it, if you're willing to grind through enough math instead of a sales pitch, is one of the highest paying careers most people never even consider. But a license and a commission check is still just a job working inside somebody else's company.
而它上面的天花板，如果你愿意钻研足够的数学，而不是靠推销话术，就是收入最高的职业之一，大多数人甚至从未考虑过。但一张执照和一份佣金支票仍然只是在别人的公司里打工。
The real money in this industry was never in selling the policy. No, it's in owning the thing that collects the premium. And in the last few years, some of the richest investors on Earth figured out exactly how to buy their way into that seat.
这个行业真正赚钱的地方从来都不是卖保单。不，而是拥有那个收取保费的东西。而在过去几年里，地球上一些最富有的投资者已经弄清楚了如何用钱买进那个席位。
Chapter 8 C. The people buying the industry itself. Now, two very differentized doors lead to owning a piece of this industry, and almost nobody realizes they're different sizes until they try to walk through one.
第8章 C。那些买下整个行业的人。现在，有两扇截然不同的门可以让你拥有这个行业的一席之地，属于这个行业的一部分，而几乎没有人意识到它们的大小不同，直到他们试图穿过其中一扇。
The smaller door is an insurance agency. You don't need to underwrite anything or hold reserves to cover claims. You're just the middleman, matching customers to the companies that carry the real risk.
较小的那扇门是保险代理机构。你不需要承保任何东西，也不需要持有准备金来覆盖理赔。你只是中间人，将客户与公司进行匹配而公司承担真正的风险。
Plenty of independent agents eventually buy or build their own agency, and thousands of small agencies get bought and sold every year like any other small business. Over the past decade, private equity firms noticed that same opportunity and started buying up agencies by the hundreds, rolling small local shops into giant national brokerages.
许多独立agent最终会购买或建立自己的代理机构，每年有成千上万的小型代理机构被买卖就像任何其他小企业一样。在过去十年里，私募股权公司也注意到了同样的机会并开始成百上千地收购代理机构，将小型本地门店整合为大型全国性经纪公司。
It's actually one of the quietest consolidation waves The same handful of investment firms increasingly own the local office that sells you your car and home insurance, even when the sign out front still has a local family's name on it.
这实际上是美国商业中最悄无声息的整合浪潮之一同一小批投资公司越来越多地拥有当地办事处那家向你出售汽车和房屋保险的公司，即使前面的招牌上仍然有一个当地家族的名字。
But the bigger door here is starting an actual insurance carrier, the company that promises to pay the claim itself. Now, that door is nearly closed to almost everyone. A new insurer has to prove to state regulators it holds enough reserve capital to cover a truly bad year before it's allowed to sell a single policy.
但这里更大的门是创办一家真正的保险公司，即承诺自己支付索赔的公司。现在，这扇门对几乎所有人来说都几乎关闭了。一家新的保险公司必须向州监管机构证明它持有足够的准备金资本以应对真正糟糕的年份才能获准销售第一份保单。
It's the same underwriting discipline from chapter 3, just enforced by law instead of choice. You already met a smaller private version of this idea, the captive insurance company from a few chapters back.
这与第3章中的承保纪律相同，只是由法律强制执行，而非自愿选择。你已经见过这一理念的一个较小的私营版本，就是前几章提到的自保保险公司。
Building one at national scale, well, that takes billions of dollars that most people will never have access to. So instead of building a carrier from scratch, the smartest money in the world has been doing something simpler, buying one that already exists.
在全国范围内建造一个，嗯，那需要花费数十亿美元，大多数人永远无法企及。所以与其从零开始建造一艘航母，世界上最聪明的资金一直在做更简单的事，买一艘已经存在的。
Private equity firms like Apollo, KKR, Blackstone, AIS, and Brookfield have spent the last several years buying or building life insurers and annuity companies across America. Apollo's insurance firm Athen alone has completed nearly 50 pension deals worth close to $53 billion, covering the retirement of more than half a million people.
像阿波罗这样的私募股权公司，KKR、黑石、AIS以及布鲁克菲尔德在过去几年里一直在收购或建立人寿保险公司和年金公司，遍布全美。仅阿波罗旗下的保险公司Athen就完成了近50笔养老金交易，价值接近530亿美元，覆盖了超过50万人的退休金。
Now, these firms aren't doing this because they love paying out life insurance claims. No, they're doing it because every one of those policies comes with the exact same thing Buffett found at GEICO decades ago.
现在，这些公司这么做并不是因为他们喜欢支付人寿保险理赔。不，他们这么做是因为每一份保单都附带几十年前巴菲特在GEICO发现的一模一样的东西。
A giant pile of float. Premium money sitting for years before it ever has to go back out the door. And some of them push that float even further than Buffett did, routing it through offshore reinsurers based in Bermuda, where capital rules are lighter and the money can flow into higher yield, harder to see assets like private credit.
一大堆浮存金。巨额保费资金闲置多年在它最终必须流出之前。而其中一些公司甚至将这笔浮存金运用得比巴菲特更为极致，通过位于百慕大的离岸再保险公司进行运作，那里的资本规则更为宽松资金可以流入收益率更高、更难被察觉的资产，比如私募信贷。
By 2024, the amount of US life insurance business backed this way had grown to over $900 billion, more than four times what it was just 14 years earlier. Buffett didn't invent this trick of turning insurance float into a fortune.
到2024年，美国以这种方式支撑的人寿保险业务金额已增长到超过9000亿美元，是仅仅14年前的4倍多。巴菲特并非发明这一把保险浮存金变成巨额财富的诀窍的人。
Now, he just got there first. A whole generation of the richest investors alive spent the last decade racing to copy his homework, just with somebody else's balance sheet doing the buying.
只不过，他是第一个做到的人。整整一代在世的最富有投资者在过去十年里争相抄袭他的作业，只不过是用别人的资产负债表来买单。
But, you know, owning the machine, whether it's a single agency or an entire insurer, it comes with a catch that nobody selling you the dream mentions. The machine still has to actually work.
但是，你知道，拥有这台机器，无论是一个单一机构还是整个保险公司，都附带一个陷阱，而向你兜售这个梦想的人对此只字不提。这台机器仍然必须真正运转起来。
And the way it works is starting to change faster than most of the people running it expected. Chapter 9. When the machine breaks. Now, before California, some scale. Insurers put a number on the worst single events in modern history through what they call insured losses.
而它的运作方式正开始发生变化比大多数运营它的人预期的要快。第九章。当机器损坏时。现在，在加利福尼亚之前，先看看一些规模。保险公司对最严重的单一事件给出了一个数字在现代历史中通过他们所谓的保险损失。
The part of the damage that actually got paid out. Hurricane Katrina alone cost insurers roughly $45 billion in 2005. The September 11th attacks cost the industry around $40 billion across property, aviation, and liability claims combined.
实际获得赔付的那部分损失。仅卡特里娜飓风就让保险公司损失了约450亿美元在2005年。9·11袭击事件使该行业损失了约400亿美元涉及财产险、航空险和责任险索赔的总和。
Japan's 2011 earthquake and tsunami cost insurers roughly 35 to40 billion out of more than 210 billion in total damage, meaning insurance covered less than a fifth of what that disaster actually destroyed.
2011年日本地震和海啸让保险公司损失了大约350亿至400亿美元，而总损失超过2100亿美元，这意味着保险覆盖的金额不到那场灾难实际摧毁的五分之一。
Even the biggest, best funded reinsurance system in the world has a ceiling. California is what happens when insurers decide they're getting close to it. Now, California is the clearest example happening right now.
即使是世界上规模最大、资金最雄厚的再保险体系也有上限。加利福尼亚的情况就是当保险公司认为自己正接近这个上限时会发生的事。现在，加利福尼亚就是当下最明显的例子。
In 2024, State Farm canled or refused to renew about 72,000 homeowner policies across California, while Allstate made similar moves around the same time. Both companies gave the same blunt reason.
2024年，State Farm取消或拒绝续签加利福尼亚州约72,000份房主保单，而Allstate也在同一时期采取了类似举措。两家公司给出了同样直白的理由。
Wildfire risk had gotten too expensive to price fairly under California's rules, limiting how much they're allowed to raise prices. So, instead of charging what the real risk cost, they simply stopped covering it.
野火风险已经变得过于昂贵，难以公平定价根据加利福尼亚州的规定，限制了他们被允许提高价格的上限。所以，与其按照真实风险的成本收费，他们干脆停止承保。
Families who got dropped increasingly had nowhere left to go except the state's backup plan, insurance of last resort, built for exactly this kind of gap, and now stretched thin trying to cover it.
被抛弃的家庭越来越无处可去除了州政府的后备计划，最后的保险，正是为这种缺口而建，如今却捉襟见肘，勉力填补。
And that's what happens when the real math and the regulators rules stop agreeing with each other. The company doesn't eat the loss forever. It simply walks away from the table. Then there's the kind of break that nobody can plan for.
这就是当真实的算术与监管规则不再彼此吻合时会发生的事。公司不会永远承担损失。它只是从桌边走开。然后还有一种没人能预料到的中断。
In February 2024, hackers hit Change Healthcare, a company owned by United Health that processes an enormous share of America's medical claims behind the scenes, invisible to almost everyone whose bill runs through it.
2024年2月，黑客攻击了Change Healthcare，这是一家由联合健康拥有的公司，它在幕后处理着美国医疗索赔中极其庞大的份额，对于几乎所有账单经由它流转的人来说都不可见。
The company reported an initial cost of $872 million with the full recovery bill eventually topping $2.3 billion and reports that a $22 million ransom got paid just to get the systems back online.
该公司报告称初始成本为8.72亿美元而全面恢复费用最终超过23亿美元并有报道称支付了2200万美元赎金仅仅是为了让系统重新上线。
For weeks, claims slowed to a crawl across parts of the country. A reminder that underneath every actuarial table and every fancy ratio, this whole machine is still just software running on servers that can get knocked over like anything else people build.
数周以来，索赔速度慢如蜗牛在全国部分地区。提醒一下，在每一张精算表和每一个花哨的比率之下，这整台机器仍然只是软件，运行在服务器上，而这些服务器也会像人们建造的任何东西一样被推翻。
All right, so now you've seen how the whole machine runs, and you've seen it break twice in public. That naturally raises an honest question that nobody in this industry wants you asking out loud.
好了，现在你已经看到了整台机器是如何运行的，而且你已经看到它在公众面前两次出故障。这自然引出了一个实在的问题，这个行业里没人愿意让你大声问出来。
Chapter 9B. The casino you should actually play. Now, every insurance company on Earth is built to collect more in premiums than it pays out in claims, averaged across every customer it has.
第9B章。你真正应该玩的赌场。如今，世界上每一家保险公司的建立都是为了收取更多的保费而不是支付索赔，这是对其所有客户的平均值。
That's not a conspiracy. It's the entire combined ratio idea from Chapter 3. If insurers didn't collect more than they paid out on average, the industry would not exist. So on a purely mathematical expected value basis, buying insurance is a losing bet almost every single time.
这不是阴谋。这正是第3章中的综合比率概念。如果保险公司平均收取的保费不超过赔付金额，这个行业就不会存在。所以，单纯从数学期望值的角度来看，购买保险几乎每一次都是亏本的赌注。
The casino comparison holds up as a fact, not just a figure of speech. But that comparison also tells you exactly when insurance stops being a losing bet and starts being the smartest move on the table.
赌场的类比作为一个事实是成立的，而不仅仅是一种修辞说法。但这个类比也确切地告诉你保险在什么时候不再是亏本的赌注而开始成为牌桌上最明智的选择。
Just think about a blackjack player with a fixed bankroll for the night. Betting $5 a hand on a bad run costs them nothing they can't absorb. But betting their entire rent money on one hand is a different decision entirely.
想象一下一个二十一点玩家带着一晚固定的资金。在运气不好时每手押5美元对他们来说毫无无法承受的损失。但把整月的房租钱押上孤注一掷则是完全不同的决定。
Even if the odds on that single hand are identical. The math doesn't change. What changes is whether losing would actually ruin them or not. And that's the real test for every policy you're offered.
即使那一手牌的胜算完全相同。数学计算不会改变。改变的是输掉是否会真的毁掉他们或不会。这就是对你所收到的每一份保单的真正考验。
Would losing this money without insurance be annoying or would it be ruinous? A cracked phone screen is annoying. You can self-insure that, meaning you can just pay to fix it yourself if that happens, and then skip the extended warranty, which is one of the worst expected value products sold in America.
没有保险而损失这笔钱会让人烦恼还是会造成毁灭性打击？手机屏幕裂了让人烦恼。你可以自保，意思是如果发生这种情况，你可以自己花钱修，然后跳过延长保修，这是预期价值最差的产品之一在美国销售的。
But a house burning down, a car accident that puts someone in the hospital, a diagnosis that stops you from working, those are ruinous. You can't self-insure your way out of losing your house or your ability to earn an income.
但房子烧毁，一场车祸让人住院，一个让你无法工作的诊断，这些是毁灭性的。你无法通过自保来避免失去房子或失去赚取收入的能力。
So, you pay the loaded house always wins price anyway because the alternative isn't a loss that you can absorb. It's a loss that ends the game entirely. That is who should buy insurance and who shouldn't.
所以，你无论如何都要支付那个庄家永远赢的加价因为另一种选择不是一场你能承受的损失。那是一场彻底终结游戏的损失。这就是谁应该买保险，谁不应该买。
Stripped down to one question. Can you comfortably survive this exact loss out of your own pocket tomorrow? If yes, you're better off skipping the policy and banking the premium yourself over time.
归结为一个问题。你能轻松承受这一确切损失明天自掏腰包吗？如果是这样，你最好放弃这份保单自己把保费一点点存起来。
If not, pay the house its edge. gladly because that edge is the exact price of staying in the game at all. Now, every answer in this video so far has been about the industry as it exists right now.
如果不是，就把优势让给庄家。心甘情愿地，因为那个优势正是留在局中所付出的确切代价。到目前为止，这个视频里的每个答案都是关于这个行业的就它目前的状况而言。
But the industry is already rebuilding itself around a completely different idea. One that most people haven't noticed yet, and it's worth knowing where this is all heading next. Chapter 9 C.
但这个行业已经在围绕着一个完全不同的理念重建自身。一个大多数人还没有注意到的理念，而了解这一切接下来会走向何方是值得的。第9章 C。
The insurance company that watches you first. Remember that algorithm from chapter 6? the one that reportedly spent about 1 second deciding whether to deny a health claim. Well, that was not the finish line for this industry.
先监视你的保险公司。还记得第6章的那个算法吗？据说只花了大约1秒钟来决定是否驳回一项健康声明。嗯，那并不是这个行业的终点线。
No, it was the opening move. Car insurers already sell apps that track how you actually drive, not how you say you drive. Hard breaking, sharp turns, how fast you take a corner, even what time of night you're on the road.
不，那只是开场第一步。汽车保险公司已经在销售应用程序来追踪你的实际驾驶方式，而不是你自称的驾驶方式。急刹车、急转弯，你过弯的速度有多快，甚至你夜间什么时候在路上。
All measured minuteby through a phone in your cup holder holder or a small device plugged into your dashboard. companies built entirely around this idea alongside legacy insurers running their own versions of it.
所有这些都被逐分钟测量通过你杯架里的手机或插在仪表板上的小型设备。完全围绕这一理念建立的公司与传统保险公司并驾齐驱运营着它们自己的版本。
Use that data to price your policy off your real behavior instead of a form you filled out once. Drive carefully, your prices can drop, but drive like you're late for something. The algorithm will notice that, too.
用这些数据来为你的保单定价依据你的真实行为而不是你曾经填写过的表格。小心驾驶，你的保费就能降低，但如果你开车像赶时间一样，那就另当别论了。算法也会注意到这一点。
China's biggest private insurer is already showing where this goes next. Ping now automates close to 60% of its accident and health claims. Some settled in as little as 51 seconds without a person ever reading the file.
中国最大的私营保险公司已经展示了接下来的走向。平安现在自动化处理近60%的事故和健康理赔。有些仅需51秒即可完成全程无需任何人阅读文件。
It also uses facial and voice recognition with reported accuracy above 99% to verify who's filing a claim and to confirm its own 1.4 million agents actually showing up for work, scanning their faces just to sign into a morning meeting.
它还使用了面部和声音识别技术据报道准确率超过99%以核实提出索赔者的身份并确认其旗下140万名agent确实到岗工作，仅为了签到参加晨会就要扫描面部。
The company frames all of it as fraud prevention, and some of it really is. But it's also a preview of a version of insurance where the company is watching you before you ever need to file anything at all.
公司将这一切都包装为防范欺诈，其中有些确实如此。但这也预示了一种保险模式的雏形在这种模式下，公司会在你还没提出任何申请之前就一直监视着你。
Not just pricing the risk you bring to it, but actively shaping your behavior to keep that risk low in the first place. And as an aside here, 51 seconds. That is how quickly some of Pingan's AI reviewed claims get approved and paid start to finish according to the company's own reporting.
不只是为你带来的风险定价，而是主动塑造你的行为，从一开始就把风险保持在低水平。顺便说一句，51秒。这就是平安的一些AI审核理赔的速度获得批准并完成赔付的全过程根据该公司自己的报告。
Compare that to the average American waiting weeks to hear back on a denied claim from Chapter 6, and you can see exactly why every major insurer on Earth is racing to build the same kind of system.
相比之下，普通美国人要等上数周才能收到第6章中理赔被拒的回复，你就能明白为什么全球每一家大型保险公司都在竞相构建同样的系统。
That's not a paranoid guess about the future, either. It's already the pitch being sold right now as a win for careful customers. Now, whether that trade ends up saving honest drivers and patients real money or just builds the most detailed profile on you that's ever existed, well, that depends entirely on rules that nobody has fully written yet.
这也不是对未来毫无根据的猜测。这已经是目前正在推销的卖点作为对谨慎消费者的利好。那么，这种交易最终是能为诚实司机和患者省下真金白银还是只会建立起对你最详细的个人画像前所未有地详细，嗯，这完全取决于规则那些还没有人完全写出来的规则。
And that brings you right back to the same question this whole video keeps circling. Chapter 10, how to play the game. Now, none of this means you should walk away from insurance. It means stop treating it like a lottery ticket and start treating it like what it actually is.
而这又把你带回了同一个问题整个视频一直在围绕这个问题打转。第十章，如何玩游戏。现在，这一切并不意味着你应该放弃保险。这意味着不要把它当作彩票而要开始把它当作它实际上的样子。
A financial tool with a business built on top of it. And you deserve to understand both halves before you sign anything. Remember the two sides from the start of this video. You don't need eight figures to start closing that gap between them.
一个金融工具，以及建立在其上的业务。你应该了解这两个方面在签署任何文件之前。记住本视频开头提到的两个方面。你不需要八位数的收入才能开始缩小它们之间的差距。
You just need to stop playing only one side of the contract. Buy term for the job term was built for. If the goal is replacing your income for your family if you die early, the cheaper policy does exactly that job.
你只需要停止只玩合同的一方。购买定期寿险，为工作期限而设。如果目标是替代你的家庭收入如果你早逝，更便宜的保单正好能完成这个任务。
Put what you've saved somewhere else and you're running your own tiny version of Buffett's float. Except this time, you keep the interest instead of an insurance company. Read your denial letters like you already know the game.
把你省下的钱放到别处你就是在运营你自己的微型版巴菲特浮存金。只不过这一次，利息归你所有，而不是保险公司。像已经了解游戏规则一样阅读你的拒赔信。
You now know that fewer than one in a 100 people ever appeals a denied claim and that when you do fight back, they win a lot more than the system is counting on. The whole model works because most people don't push.
你现在知道，不到百分之一的人会对被拒的索赔提出上诉而当你真的反击时，你的胜算远高于这个系统所预料的。整个模式之所以奏效，是因为大多数人不会去争取。
So push anyway. Ask who's getting paid before you buy anything. Ask a captive agent straight up what they're not allowed to sell you. Ask an independent agent what commission each option pays them.
所以无论如何都要推进。买东西之前先问清楚谁在拿钱。直接问专属agent他们不允许卖给你什么。问问独立agent每个选项支付给他们多少佣金。
That's not rude. It's the same question that Buffett asks before he ever touched Geico. Where does the money actually go and who is holding it while it's on its way there? Shop your own policy every single renewal, even the ones you love.
这并不粗鲁。这是巴菲特在接触Geico之前问过的同一个问题。这笔钱实际上去了哪里，在它到达那里之前，又是谁在持有它？每次续保时都要比较你自己的保单，即使是你喜欢的那些。
Insurers have a quiet habit called price walking, raising premiums a little more each year on the customers who never leave because loyal customers rarely bother to compare prices.
保险公司有一个隐秘的习惯，叫做价格遛弯，每年都会稍微提高一点保费，针对那些从不离开的客户，因为忠诚的客户很少费心去比较价格。
While brand new customers, they get quoted the sharpest rate just to win their business. Some research puts the gap between what a loyal customer pays and what a new customer pays for the identical policy at $400 to over $1,000 a year.
而对于全新的客户，他们会得到最优惠的报价，只是为了赢得他们的生意。一些研究指出，差距在于忠实客户支付的费用与新客户支付的费用之间对于完全相同的保单，每年差距在400美元到超过1000美元之间。
The company is betting that you won't check, not rewarding you for staying. And if you're ever negotiating a claim, ask the adjuster one direct question. What's the highest number you're personally authorized to approve without a supervisor signing off?
该公司是在赌你不会去核查，而不是因为你留下来而奖励你。如果你曾经协商过索赔，问理赔员一个直接的问题。在没有主管签字批准的情况下，你个人被授权批准的最高金额是多少？
Every adjuster has a dollar ceiling on what they can settle a loan, and the first offer they give you is almost never that ceiling. It's usually just the number they're hoping you'll take before you ask.
每个理赔员都有一个金额上限来决定他们能了结一笔贷款，而他们给你的第一个报价几乎从来都不是那个上限。通常只是他们希望你接受的数字在你开口之前。
And finally, insurance. wasn't built by accident. And it wasn't built out of kindness. It was built by people who understood one idea. Money that sits in the middle waiting before anyone has to give it back is worth more than almost anything else in business.
最后是保险。并非偶然建成。而它的建立并非出于善意。它是由那些明白一个道理的人建立的。停留在中间等待的资金在任何人需要归还之前其价值几乎超过商业中的任何其他东西。
Barban knew it in a burned city in 1680. Edward Lloyd knew it over coffee. Buffett knew it buying Geico. Now you know it, too. And my friend, that is episode one of a brand new series breaking down exactly how entire industries actually make their money with the receipts to prove it.
巴尔班在1680年的一座焚毁城市中领悟了它。爱德华·劳埃德在喝咖啡时领悟了它。巴菲特在收购Geico时领悟了它。现在你也知道了。而我的朋友，这就是全新系列的第一集详细剖析各个行业究竟是如何赚钱的并拿出真凭实据来证明。
If insurance just showed you how money can hide in plain sight, just wait until you see what real estate does with it. We already mapped out that entire machine and it uses a wealth trick even bigger than the float that you just learned about.
如果保险只是让你看到钱如何隐藏在明处，那就等着看房地产拿它做什么吧。我们已经完整梳理了那台机器而且它使用了一种比浮动更大的财富技巧就是你刚刚了解到的那个。
So, watch that one next right there on screen or in the description and you'll have two full industries mapped out instead of one. If you want the deeper version of everything in this video, the frameworks, the numbers, the exact playbooks to use in your own life, that's what the Alux app was built for.
所以，接下来就在屏幕上观看那一个或者在描述中，你将拥有两个完整的行业梳理而不是一个。如果你想要本视频中所有内容的更深版本，那些框架、那些数字，以及在你自己的生活中使用的确切操作手册，那就是Alux应用被打造出来的目的。
So start your free trial at alux.com/app and we will see you in the next one. Until then, take
所以，在 alux.com/app 开始您的免费试用我们下期再见。在那之前，保重
